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Abstract. Practically all theories of iconicity are denunciations of its subject 
matter (for example, those of Goodman, Bierman and the early Eco). My own 
theory of iconicity was developed in order to save a particular kind of iconicity, 
pictoriality, from such criticism. In this interest, I distinguished pure iconicity, 
iconic ground, and iconic sign, on one hand, and primary and secondary iconic 
signs, on the other hand. Since then, however, several things have happened. The 
conceptual tools that I created to explain pictoriality have been shown by others to 
be relevant to linguistic iconicity. On the other hand, semioticians with points of 
departure different from mine have identified mimicry as it is commonly found in 
the animal world as a species of iconicity. In the evolutionary semiotics of Deacon, 
                                                 
1  My preoccupation with iconicity has been life-long, but the different projects 
with which I have been involved since the beginning of this century (SGB and 
SEDSU), and the collaboration within the Centre for cognitive semiotics, which I 
am heading since January 2009, has offered me new vistas on my old theme, which 
I have tried to exploit in the present paper. I want to acknowledge here the 
assistance afforded by numerous discussions in the above-mentioned fora. The 
author wants to acknowledge the stimulating remarks made on an earlier version 
of this paper by Timo Maran and Ester Võsu, which have been attended to in the 
following. 
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iconicity is referred to in such a general way that it seems to be emptied of all 
content, while in the variety invented by Donald the term mimesis is used for a 
particular phase in the evolution of iconic meaning. The aim of this article is to 
consider to what extent the extension of iconicity theory to new domains will 
necessitate the development of new models.  
 
Within the framework of Peircean philosophy, iconic signs have 
always been taken for granted. In other quarters, on the contrary, their 
existence has been called into question: by philosophers such as 
Arthur Bierman and Nelson Goodman, as well as semioticians such as 
Umberto Eco and René Lindekens. In a series of works, starting with 
Sonesson (1989), I have tried to rehabilitate the idea of iconicity, at 
least in the case of pictures, without identifying it with “tautology”, as 
Roland Barthes (1964) did, or with “frozen mirrors”, as was recently 
suggested by Eco (1999), in a work which constituted a radical volte-
face in relation to his earlier views. In the present article, I will refrain 
from spelling out my criticism of Goodman, Bierman, Eco, and others 
(see Sonesson 1989, 1993, 1995, 2000a), but will instead formulate my 
findings as a positive theory, and then go on to consider some further 
problems. 
The conception of iconicity presented in this paper derives from an 
approach variously known as “the Swedish school”, “the ecological 
school”, and “the phenomenological school” (see Saint-Martin 1994; 
Carani 1999; Nordström 2000). The foundations of this conception 
are neither the teachings of Charles Sanders Peirce nor those of 
Ferdinand de Saussure, but the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, 
as developed by, among others, Aron Gurwitsch, Alfred Schütz, and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This approach to iconicity, however, was first 
taken in my book Pictorial Concepts (Sonesson 1989). An implication 
of this conception is that the Lifeworld, also known as the world-taken-
for-granted, the common sense world, or, in the adaptation of the 
psychologist James Gibson, as ecological physics, will be considered as 
the foundation of all possible meaning. It also imposes particular 
requirements on us to explicate basic notions such as those of sign, 
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iconicity, and pictoriality. In many ways, ecological semiotics is closer 
to, and more compatible, with the basic tenets of Peirceans semiotics 
than with the Saussurean brand.2 This is particularly true if the latter is 
understood as conceived by French Structuralism. In this framework, 
many of the concepts of Saussure-inspired semiotics retain their 
import, but only on a secondary level. However, one basic notion of 
Saussurean linguistics, hardly taken into account by French structu-
ralism (but certainly by the Prague school), the notion of pertinence or 
relevance, is a fundamental ingredient in my interpretation of iconicity. 
It will resurface in the guise of the interpretation given to the Peircean 
notion of ground.  
 
 1. From iconicity to iconic signs 
 
It is not clear whether Peirce intended to say that there are three pro-
perties which transform a phenomenon into a sign — iconicity, 
indexicality, and symbolicity — or if he just wanted to suggest that 
things which are signs could, moreover, have the properties of 
iconicity, indexicality and/or symbolicity. No matter what Peirce 
intended, I will here accept the latter interpretation. I will therefore 
give a characterisation of the sign, in terms much more specific than 
those used by Peirce, or for that matter by Saussure, and I will go on to 
suggest in what way iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity may 
accrue to something which is already a sign. I will then consider what 
these notions may amount to outside the context of signs. 
  
1.1. The sign as prototypical semiosis 
 
                                                 
2  On Peircean phaneroscopy as one of many possible variants resulting from 
Husserlean phenomenology, see Sonesson 2009b. 
Late in his life, Peirce realised that all his notions were too narrow: 
instead of “sign”, he reflected, he really ought to talk about “medium”, 
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“branching” or “mediation” (CP 4.3 and MS 339, quoted by Par-
mentier 1985). Indeed, he even remarked that there was something 
“injurious” to making the word “sign” do a much bigger job than that 
to which it was fitted. Here Peirce sounds very much as Humpty 
Dumpty becoming at last aware of his ruse. And yet, it is also in 
accordance with Peirce’s “ethics of terminology”, which states that we 
should not introduce terms that “interfere with any existing term” (see 
EP 2: 263–266). Strange to say, those who like to think of themselves 
as the true Peirceans do not seem to have taken into account this piece 
of self-criticism on the part of Peirce.  
In the following, I will take the sign to be one of the (more 
complex) ways in which meaning may be realised. Let us start out by 
considering what some central instances of signs could be, and then 
try to determine what they have in common. The linguistic sign is 
clearly an instance. The picture sign (in a sense which will be 
elaborated on below) is, I believe, basically similar to the linguistic sign, 
and so are at least some gestures. Play-acting, as well as children’s 
symbolic play, would seem to be of the same general kind. I am not, of 
course, arguing that these kinds of meaning are all conventional, as 
would Umberto Eco, Nelson Goodman (1968), and many others 
whose arguments I have long ago rejected (see Sonesson 1989, 1993, 
1995, 2000a). I am not even arguing that play-acting or symbolic play 
instantiate the same kind of iconicity as the picture; indeed, I am 
comparing all three of them to the linguistic sign, which is basically 
conventional. However, they all possess that which would allow the 
presence of a convention, just as well as a motivated relation: (at least) 
two parts. Indeed, Saussure (1973) here was the more subtle 
phenomenologist: quite apart from what it connects to in the outside 
world, that is, the referent, the sign itself has two parts, because beside 
that which is perceived, it also contains something which construes 
the referent in a particular way.  
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According to Jean Piaget’s account of child development, every 
child goes through a number of different stages enhancing his or her 
capacity for understanding. Of particular importance in the present 
context, however, is Piaget’s (1967[1945], 1967: 134ff, 1970: 342ff) 
claim that, on the border between sensori-motor thinking and 
concrete operations, around 18 months of age, the child learns to 
master “the semiotic function” (originally called the symbolic 
function), which involves, not only language, but also, notably, 
drawing and symbolic play. Piaget does not deny that the child 
experiences meaning before this age, for instance in perception (thus 
anticipating the criticism of Trevarthen, Logotheti 1989), but he thinks 
that it is only with the attainment of the semiotic function that the 
child is able to conceive meaning as something differentiated into a 
signifier and a signified. It should be kept in mind, nevertheless, that 
Piaget is here talking about the capacity for producing language, 
pictures, etc., and not the ability to interpret them. As in the case of 
language, the capacity to understand pictures would most naturally be 
taken to precede any ability to produce them. However, we are not 
concerned here with the moment of emergence of the sign function, 
but with its structure. 
The notion of differentiation, which is normally overlooked, is 
fundamental in my view. But it is also indispensable to maintain the 
distinction between subjective and objective differentiation. The 
semiotic function, or, as I will say from now on, the sign (function) 
requires “a differentiation, from the subject’s own point of view, 
between the signifier and the signified” (Piaget 1967: 134f). Thus, for 
instance, the visible extremity of an object that is almost entirely 
hidden from view is the signifier of the entire object for the baby, but 
it also happens to be “an objective aspect of the signified” and thus, 
according to Piaget (ibid.), it cannot be a sign. But when the child uses 
a pebble to signify candy, Piaget claims, the child is well aware of the 
difference between them, that is, there is subjective differentiation.  
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Although Piaget obviously does not say so, his notion of 
differentiation is, in my opinion, different from Hockett’s “design 
feature” of displacement (see Hockett, Altmann 1968). Elsewhere, at 
least, I have taken the view that a label on a bird case showing the 
picture and the name of an animal that is also present in the cage is 
still differentiated and therefore a sign (see Sonesson 2009b). On the 
other hand, displacement would seem to presuppose differentiation. 
Curiously, Piaget takes for granted that something which is not 
objectively differentiated cannot be subjectively so. However, we can 
imagine this same child that in Piaget’s example uses a pebble to stand 
for a piece of candy having recourse instead to a feather in order to 
represent a bird, or employ a pebble to stand for a rock, without 
therefore confusing the part and the whole: then the child would be 
employing a feature, which is objectively a part of the bird, or the rock, 
while differentiating the former from the latter from his point of view. 
Moreover, contrary to what Piaget (1967: 134) submits, the hunter, 
who identifies the animal by means of the tracks, and then employs 
them to find out which direction the animal has taken, and who does 
this in order to catch the animal, does not, in spite of the existence of a 
physical and temporal relationship between the animals and its tracks, 
confound the tracks with the animal itself in his construal of the sign, 
in which case he would be satisfied with the former. Indeed, if the 
tracks are not differentiated from the animal having produced them, 
they cannot be read as signs, but only as a part of the complex 
situation of which the animal is a part. Differentiation may possibly be 
a result of the object that serves as signifier not being continuous in 
space and/or time with the object serving as signified, as well as of 
taking the signifier to be of a different general category of the world 
than the signified, but there could also be other criteria that remain to 
be delineated. 
If Saussure and Piaget may be said to have made a fairly good, but 
not particularly explicit, phenomenological job, Husserl himself could 
be expected to have some contribution to offer to the phenomenology 
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of signs. Indeed, Husserl’s discussion of signs (which he calls “repre-
sentations”) may help us spell out what is involved in “subjective 
differentiation”. According to Husserl (1939), indeed, two or more 
items may enter into different kinds of “pairings”, from the “paired 
association” of two co-present items through the “appresentative 
pairing” in which one item is present and the other indirectly given 
through the first, to the real sign relation, where again one item is 
directly present and the other only indirectly so, but where the indi-
rectly presented member of the pair is the theme, that is, the centre of 
attention for consciousness. This clearly implies that the sign is 
asymmetrical in a double sense: one part of it is more in focus than the 
other, and the second of its parts is more directly accessible than the 
first one. In perception, on the other hand, the highest degree of focus 
and directness coincide.  
But we should take these observations further: since what is at 
stake is a thematic structuring, and this structuring itself is relative to a 
subject for whom it is a part of the field of consciousness, the first part 
of the sign is in some sense a stand which the subject may take on the 
other. In more familiar terms, the first part of the sign is “about” the 
other. Of course, this more readily applies to the relation between the 
content and the referent, where the latter corresponds in the world 
outside of the sign to that with which the sign is concerned. Husserl 
(1980), in fact, makes this distinction clearly only in his study of 
picture consciousness, where he notes that the depicted Berlin palace 
is here in the picture, whereas the real palace is in Berlin (see Sonesson 
1989: 270ff, 2006; Zlatev 2009). As I have suggested elsewhere 
(Sonesson 1989: 193ff), we would thus have to suppose some kind of 
thematic hierarchy going (in the ordinary case) from the expression 
through the content to the referent. 
Thus we can minimally define the sign by the following properties: 
a.  It contains (at least) two parts (expression and content) and is as a 
whole relatively independent of that for which it stands (the 
referent);  
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b.  These parts are differentiated, from the point of view of the 
subjects involved in the semiotic process, even though they may 
not be so objectively, that is, in the common sense Lifeworld 
(except as signs forming part of that Lifeworld); 
c.  There is a double asymmetry between the two parts, because one 
part, expression, is more directly experienced than the other; and 
because the other part, content, is more in focus than the other; 
d.  The sign itself is subjectively differentiated from the referent, and 
the referent is more indirectly known than any part of the sign.3 
 
There are reasons to believe that the sign, in this sense, is available to 
very few, if any, animal species apart from human beings (let alone 
single cells), and that it is acquired fairly late in child development. To 
demonstrate such a claim is certainly not easy, because we cannot 
simply ask apes and doves, or for that matter, infants or somewhat 
older children, whether they have signs. Thus, we must have recourse 
to experimental studies, where the measures obtained can only be 
indirect. 
The picture could be considered the best testing case, because, 
unlike the linguistic sign, it must contain both similarity and diffe-
rence. Some comments are in order: first of all, it would be pre-
posterous even to suggest that animals are incapable of all kinds of 
semiosis. We are involved here with a special kind of semiosis defined 
as sign. In the second place, there is no presumption in the present 
context, hidden or not, that pictures are common in nature, contrary 
to what Maran suspects4. Indeed, the only picture-like object featured 
in nature is no doubt the surface of water, if we do not take into 
account the kind of latter-day humanized nature that includes 
                                                 
3  The referent will also ordinarily be more in focus than the sign, if we suppose 
what in Anglo-Saxon philosophy of language is called “opaque contexts” to be the 
exception. See Sonesson 1989: 193ff. 
4  This and later comments by Maran come from the editorial review of the 
present article, if not indicated otherwise. 
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polished metal sheets (and later on real mirrors). Whether an 
enhanced experience of pictures may be capable of augmenting the 
picture interpretation skills of animals is indeed the question.  
Experiments have shown that even children 5 months of age look 
longer at a doll than at its picture (DeLoache, Burns 1994). However, it 
does not follow from this that the children see the picture as a picture. 
Indeed, 9 months olds, but not 18 month olds, try to grasp the object 
depicted as if it were a real object (DeLoache 2004); whatever the 
difference they perceive, then, it does not seem to involve signs as 
opposed to objects. This result shows that the picture and its object are 
seen as being different, but not necessarily as forming a sign-vehicle 
and its referent. The real doll is perhaps seen as a more prototypical 
instance of the category; or, alternatively, the real object may be more 
interesting because of having more perceptual predicates.  
In an interesting study realized within the SEDSU-project (Zlatev 
et al. 2006), baboons, chimpanzees, and gorillas were tested with 
pebbles or slices of banana, either real or in photographic pictures, 
which were presented in different contrasted pairs (Parron et al. 2008; 
summarized in Sonesson, Zlatev, forthcoming).5 A considerable majo-
rity, all species put together, chose the real banana, and very few chose 
the picture of the banana when the real banana was opposed to its 
picture. Most of the primates tested, except for the chimpanzees, also 
showed a reliable bias for the banana picture over the real pebble, as 
well as for the picture of the banana over the picture of the pebble. 
Moreover, a majority of the primates, but no chimpanzees, show a 
tendency of trying to eat the banana pictures. Therefore, it might be 
intimated that the chimpanzees, different from the other primates, 
have some understanding of signs, rather than simply seeing the 
                                                 
5  The SEDSU project (for “Stages in the Evolution and Development of Signs 
Use”) was a EU-financed research project involving semioticians, linguistics, 
psychologists and primatologists from Sweden, Great Britain, Germany, France 
and Italy, and for which the present author wrote the conclusions, together with 
Jordan Zlatev (Sonesson, Zlatev, forthcoming).  
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banana picture as some less good instance of the category of bananas. 
Another experiment within the SEDSU-project involved a single 
chimpanzee, Alex, who had been trained to imitate 20 different action 
sequences beforehand, and who in a new experiment was solicited to 
perform these actions, prompted, not by a live model as before, but by 
being shown the actions on video, colour photographs, black and 
white photographs and drawings (Call et al., forthcoming). Of parti-
cular interest is the fact that the chimpanzee was able to accomplish 
these actions when shown pictures representing a pre-final phase of 
the sequence just as well as when confronted with pictures of the final 
state. It would seem far-fetched to suggest that the chimpanzee is here 
simply confusing the still photograph and the action, in particular 
when the photograph shows an incomplete action, where the picture 
prompting the action is distinct from the action requested, both 
because it is a static view of the action and because it does not show 
the action in its complete or most characteristic state. Perhaps, then, 
the understanding of picture signs is within the purview of chim-
panzee capacities. 
 
 
1.2. Iconicity, indexicality, symbolicity — within the sign 
 
It is customary to distinguish iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs. 
Although similar divisions have been made many times before, 
Peirce’s terminology is nowadays the one that is most often used. 
However, from this terminology follow certain presuppositions, some 
of which may be welcome to us, when considered from a pheno-
menological point of view, while others being less so. In the following, 
I do not want to quarrel with this trichotomy. Instead, I am going to 
present an interpretation of this particular Peircean trichotomy, which 
seems to be compatible with phenomenological experience, as far as it 
goes, to the extent that iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity are 
distinguished from their use in forming grounds and as further bases 
for sign functions. 
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The division between icons, indices, and symbols is one of the Peir-
cean trichotomies. It thus necessarily relates to the basic categories First-
ness, Secondness, and Thirdness, in that order. Conceived in strictly 
Peircean terms, iconicity is one of the three relationships in which a 
representamen (expression) may stand to its object (content or referent). 
It is one of three kinds of relationships that may be taken as a “ground” 
for some two things forming a sign. More precisely, iconicity is the first 
kind of these relationships, termed Firstness, “the idea of that which is 
such as it is regardless of anything else” (CP 5.66), as it applies to the 
relation in question. Considerations of iconicity must start out from the 
iconic “ground”, or what has been described as the “potential iconic 
sign”. Peirce himself identifies “ground” with “abstraction” exempli-
fying it with the blackness of two black things (CP 1.293). In fact, some 
passages from Peirce (CP 1.551–3; EP 1:1–10) seem to suggest that 
Peirce would reserve the term “ground” for the portion of the expres-
sion singled out and use the term “correlate” for the corresponding part 
of the content. This would however seem to do away with the relational 
character of the notion involved.6 It therefore seems that the term 
“ground” could stand for those properties of the two things entering 
into the sign function, by means of which they get connected, that is, 
both some properties of the thing serving as expression and some 
properties of the thing serving as content. The ground is a part of the 
sign having the function to pick out the relevant elements of expression 
and content. It thus corresponds to what Saussure calls “form”, as 
                                                 
6  Although Peirce does not mention this in any of the quoted contexts, this 
would seem to be an abstraction in both the senses which Peirce elsewhere takes 
care to distinguish: from the first point of view, this is a “dissociation”, because it 
separates the quality of being black from other colours (as distinct from 
“prescission”, which separates that which may exist independently, and from 
“discrimination”, which divide things which can only be so divided in thought); 
but it is also a “hypostatic abstraction”, because it goes from a property to an 
object (Husserl would talk about “nominalisation”). For an enlightening treatment 
of “Peirce’s two theories of abstraction”, see Stjernfelt (2007: 246ff). 
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opposed to “substance”, and which by his followers, in particular in 
phonology, has been termed pertinence or relevance.7  
Paraphrasing Peirce, we may say that two items share an iconic 
ground to the extent that there are some or other set of properties which 
these items possess independently of each other, which are identical or 
similar when considered from a particular point of view, or which may 
be perceived or, more broadly, experienced as being identical or similar. 
A few glosses are required, however, which go beyond Peirce. Here 
similarity is taken to be an identity perceived on the background of 
fundamental difference. Two items sharing an iconic ground are apt to 
enter, in the capacity of being its expression and content, into a semiotic 
function forming an iconic sign, but the ground as such may also have 
other uses directly in perception. The latter possibility is different from 
what is conceived by Peirce, but it results from our concept of sign being 
much more precise and thus more narrow (see Sonesson 1989: 201ff, 
2001a, 2007, 2008 forthcoming).  
Contrary to the indexical ground, which is a relation, the iconic 
ground thus consists of a set of two classes of properties ascribed to two 
different “things”, which are taken to possess the properties in question 
independently, not only of the sign relation, but also of each other. 
Indexicality as such involves two “things” (Secondness), and may there-
fore be conceived independently of the sign function. Since iconicity is 
Firstness, however, it only concerns one “thing”. Indeed, as Peirce (CP 
3.1., 3.362, 4.447) never tires of repeating, a pure icon cannot even exist: 
it is a disembodied quality, which we may experience for a floating 
                                                 
7  I do indeed think the ground must be a case of Secondness, since it is 
relational, as Table 1 should make clear, though I may be guilty of not spelling it 
out elsewhere, as De Cuypere (2008: 69) observes. Precisely because the (iconic) 
ground is relational, contrary to pure iconicity, there is thus no contradiction 
between what is said above, contrary to Timo Maran’s judicious remark, and the 
Peircean definition quoted below according to which iconicity as such is inde-
pendent of any other property possessed by other things involved. See Sonesson 
2006, 2007, 2009a, 2010, forthcoming. 
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instant when contemplating a painting out of awareness. Perhaps, then, 
to use some of Peirce’s own examples, the blackness of a blackbird, or 
the fact of Franklin being American, can be considered iconicities; when 
we compare two black things or Franklin and Rumford from the point 
of view of their being Americans, we establish an iconic ground; but 
only when one of the black things is taken to stand for the other, or 
when Rumford is made to represent Franklin, do they become iconic 
signs (or hypo-icons, as Peirce sometimes said). Just as indexicality is 
conceivable, but is not a sign until it enters the sign relation, iconicity 
has some kind of being, but does not exist until a comparison takes 
place. In this sense, if indexicality is a potential sign, iconicity is only a 
potential ground. This is outlined in Table 1. One further remark is in 
order: given the more precise definition of the sign formulated here, as I 
have had to realise recently (cf. Sonesson 2006, 2007, 2009a, 2010 and 
1.3 below), there clearly are numerous examples of symbolic grounds 
which are not signs (traffic regulations, and so on), although this 
unfortunately destroys the nice triadic harmony of the table.  
 
 
Table 1. The relationship between principles, grounds, and signs, from the point 
of view of Peirce (as revised in the text). The symbolic ground is in italics in the 
table, because there are reasons to think Peirce would not allow for any such 
ground distinct from the sign relation. 
 
 Firstness 
Impression 
Secondness 
Relation 
Thirdness 
Habituation/Rule 
Firstness 
Principle 
Iconicity — — 
Secondness 
Ground 
Iconic ground Indexicality = 
indexical ground 
Symbolicity = 
symbolic ground 
Thirdness 
Sign 
Iconic sign   
(icon) 
Indexical sign 
(index) 
symbolic sign 
(Symbol) 
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Since the iconic ground is established on the basis of properties the 
two items possess only because of being what they are, the standard of 
comparison must be something like similarity or identity. Indeed, 
Peirce also says that an icon (more exactly, a hypoicon) is “a sign 
which stands for something merely because it resembles it” (CP 3.362) 
or “partak[es] in the characters of the object” (CP 4.531). When 
conceiving iconicity as engendering a “referential illusion” and as 
forming a stage in the generation of “figurative” meaning out of the 
abstract base structure, Greimas and Courtés (1979: 148, 177), like 
many others, identify iconicity with perceptual appearance. In fact, 
however, not only is iconicity not particularly concerned with “optical 
illusion” or “realistic rendering”, but it does not necessarily involve 
perceptual predicates: many of Peirce’s examples (see Sonesson 1989: 
204ff), have to do with mathematical formulae, and even the fact of 
being American is not really perceptual, even though some of its 
manifestations may be. This is the conception of iconicity that will be 
taken for granted here. 
 
 
1.3. Iconicity, indexicality and symbolicity in the world 
 
Perception is imbued with meaning, and this meaning may often by 
iconic and/or indexical. According to the phenomenologist Aron 
Gurwitsch (1964: 176f), perception carries meaning, but “in a more 
broad sense than is usually understood”, which tends to be “confined 
to meanings of symbols”, that is, our signs. Indeed, as Gurwitsch 
(1964: 262ff) goes on to suggest, some kind of meaning (or, in our 
terms, semiosis) is already necessary for some irregularities on the 
surface to be perceived as being marks, even before these marks serve 
as carriers of the meanings found in words. Criticising other 
psychologists, Gurwitsch notes that the carrier of meaning is not part 
of the meaning of a sign, that is, the expression is not part of the 
content, unlike what happens in perception: the latter is made up of 
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perspectives (noemata) which are integral parts of larger wholes. 
Meaning, in the sense of the Bedeutungslehre of Jakob von Uexküll 
(1956) would be of this kind, and therefore would not involve any 
signs (see Sonesson 2007). 
As I have formulated the same distinction elsewhere (Sonesson 
1989), perception involves wholes which amount to more than their 
parts; signs have to do with something which is something else than what 
they stand for. When first formulating this distinction, I was certainly 
thinking of the way in which each item given to perception is integrated, 
horizontally so to speak, into a wider perceptual context, a configuration 
or Gestalt. Such a relation surely pertains to indexicality. But there is 
also a sense in which something is more than it appears to be at first, 
vertically, to pursue the same metaphor, because it is a member of a 
particular category. To the extent that we are talking about categori-
zation as an immediate, that is, not a conscious choice (that is, in the 
sense of “categorical perception”), this clearly has something to do with 
iconicity. Not, to be sure, with iconicity per se, but rather with the iconic 
ground, because any ground must already suppose relational thinking. 
It will be noted that the two traits I suggested above to account for 
differentiation are designated to exclude too much indexicality (no 
continuity) and too much iconicity (not the same category) in this sense. 
In the first neuropsychological treatise couched in Peircean 
terminology, written by Terrence Deacon (1997: 74ff), iconicity comes 
out as the night in which all cats are grey. It is the fact of there being 
no distinction: the perception of the same “stuff” over and over again. 
It is, he maintains, like camouflage: the moth’s wings being seen by the 
bird as “just more tree”. He goes on to suggest that iconicity is 
recognition, that is, the identification of a category, and even “stimulus 
generalisation” (Deacon 1997: 77ff). He then claims that “typical 
cases” such as pictures are essentially of the same kind: what makes 
pictures into icons is “the facet or stage that is the same for a sketch 
and the face it portrays”. At some level, this may be true: however, 
while the fact of there being no distinction is iconicity per se, 
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recognition and/or categorization would seem to require some 
awareness of a relationship, and thus must depend on an iconic 
ground, and a picture is a full iconic sign (indeed, as we shall say later 
on, a primary iconic sign; see Sonesson 2006). 
In von Uexküll’s classical example, the tick does not have to think 
twice when it perceives the smell of butyric acid emitted by the skin 
glands of a mammal; it does not have to tell itself that, although this is 
a human being, not a rabbit or a dog, they have the same smell. 
Actually, since there is only one such smelling event in its life, it 
cannot compare smells; but even if its span of experience had been 
larger, it has no business comparing. There simply is one mammal 
smell to the tick. This mammal smell may certainly be described as a 
type given in the genetic memory of the tick, as Maran suggests, but it 
is then the only type accessible to this memory.8 
At some level, no doubt, human beings also perceive the world in 
this generality. It is often observed that we have a categorical per-
ception of language sounds, since the physical characteristics are 
gradual, but at some point in this continuum, depending on the rules 
of our language, we perceive borders separating different phonemes. 
However, at the same time, we are able to make use of other 
information contained in the sound wave in order to determine the 
dialect of the speaker, his intonation, and so on. The tick, however, 
apparently does not care about the rabbit or dog modification of the 
general smell of butyric acid. More importantly, however, we can 
perceive some phenomenon to be an exemplar instantiating a 
particular type — which is to say that, at the same time as we are aware 
of the type, we can also acknowledge the exemplar.  
The difference between type and exemplar is described by Peirce 
with the terms “type” and “token” (or “replica”).9 In the previous 
                                                 
8  In strictly Peircean terms, this is of course not a “type”, but a “tone”, since we 
are at the level of Firstness.  
9  As noted above, the tick’s experience is probably, in Peirce’s conception, only 
a “tone”—which is Firstness, in the same trichotomy in which “token” and “type” 
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phrase, for example, the word “and” appears once considered as a type, 
but twice considered as a token. The letter “t” is also one type only, at 
the same time that only in the first sentence of the paragraph there 
appears eight tokens of it. This reasoning is easily extended to other 
systems of meaning; a reproduction of Leonard’s “Mona Lisa” is of the 
same type as another reproduction, but they constitute two exemplars 
or tokens of those that exist. Considered as a totality, this article is a 
single type, but it will appear in as many tokens as this journal is 
printed. As a first approximation, it seems that this article is a sign the 
type of which provides for more than one token which may be 
universally shared, and which may be said to remain at the point of 
origin while being sent out to circulate. 
It is not clear, however, that there is an experience of parts and whole 
to the tick. What is for us, as observers, three cues to the presence of a 
mammal — the smell of butyric acid, the feel of the skin, and the 
warmth of the blood — do not have to be conceived, in the case of the 
tick, as one single entity having an existence of its own (a “substance”, in 
Gibson’s terms, see J. Gibson 1979, 1982), but may more probably 
constitute three separate episodes producing each its own sequence of 
behaviour. The butyric acid is there to the tick; the mammal is present 
only to us.10 In addition, it does not make sense to say that either the 
butyric acid or the mammal is in focus or not. Nor is there any sense in 
determining whether the butyric acid or the mammal is directly given. 
                                                                                                    
are Secondness and Thirdness. But would not the experience of the tick already be 
at the level of a Peircean type, if it were already “symbolic”, as Stjernfelt (2007: 
241ff) points out against Deacon with much justification? It is certainly not easy to 
determine the application of Peircean categories. 
10  “Us” must here be taken to be considerably wider than just the human species, 
perhaps co-extensive with the class of vertebrates, as Maran suggests. This seems 
feasible in the sense of the extensional hierarchy (there is one animal, not just a 
series of events), but not in the sense of the intensional hierarchy (very few 
vertebrates will have the concept of mammal, let alone of vertebrate). Cf. Sonesson 
2009a, 2010 and the following paragraphs. 
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From the point of view of the tick, there can hardly be any difference. 
Not only are there no signs to the tick, there is not much of a world to 
explore. To be sure, there is no way for us to know how it feels to be a 
tick. But these distinctions seem utterly pointless in the Umwelt of the 
tick (that is, in terms of the functional cycle). 
Everything in the world pertains to a particular type or category; this 
is iconicity, independently of the sign function. Everything is also made 
up of parts and/or appears in the neighbourhood of something else; this 
is indexicality, before it is even used to construct signs. Human 
experience is meaningful, because it is made up of things (“substances”, 
in Gibson’s terms), which have different properties, which are members 
of different categories, and which appear in varying contexts. In the 
world of the tick, as described by von Uexküll, or that of the single cell, 
none of this makes sense. Anecdotal evidence, and even some research 
(see Tomasello 2008: 42f), suggests that the Umwelt of dogs and cats, let 
alone apes, is much more akin to that of human beings.  
In the common sense Lifeworld there are three ways of dividing 
any conceivable object: into its proper parts (for example, the head, 
the torso, the legs, etc., if the whole makes up a human body); into its 
properties (being male as opposed to being female, or being an adult 
as opposed to being a child, with reference to the same whole); and 
into its perspectives or adumbrations (the body seen from the back, 
the head seen in a three quarter view, etc. — see Sonesson 1989, 1996, 
2000a, forthcoming). These are three kinds of factoriality, which, 
along with contiguity, makes up indexicality, not as a kind of sign, but 
as a ground. A more well-known term for this is mereology, which is 
the theory of parts and wholes, derived from Husserl’s (1913) early 
work, or rather from such precursors of Husserl as Twardowski and 
Meinong (see Cavallin 1990), but given this name by the logician 
Lesniewski (see Smith 1994, 1995; Stjernfelt 2000, 2007: 161ff). One 
may also think of at least the former two divisions as making up 
hierarchies: an extensional one, which goes from bigger proper parts to 
smaller ones (arm — forearm — hand — finger — nail, etc.) and an 
Göran Sonesson  36
intensional one, which starts with general properties and ends up with 
more particular ones (animate being — human being — man — old 
man — grumpy old man, etc.). The latter can be conceived as a series 
of ever more narrow circles of category membership. In extensional 
hierarchies subcategories are less space-consuming, while in 
intensional hierarchies extension is held constant (as long as you do 
not change the referent). The limits of the arm and the nail do not 
coincide, but it is the same man who is old and grumpy, and who is an 
animate being, although the latter property is shared more widely (and 
thus intensionally more wide-ranging). 
The task of mereology is not only to account for the relations 
between the whole and its parts, but also to explain the difference 
between various kinds of totalities. Husserl opposes configurations to 
aggregates, and we find attempts of the same kind, but sometimes 
more developed, in the work of various representatives of Ganzheits-
psychologie (see Sonesson 1989: 81ff). Peirce wrote a very long but 
rather disorganised list of various kinds of totalities (quoted in 
Stjernfelt 2000). More recently, many psychologists have been sepa-
rating local cues from two modes of more holistic perception, “global 
processing” in which what is attended to are the highest level of 
hierarchical stimuli, and “configurational processing”, which is con-
cerned with the interspatial relations between elements (see discussion 
in Sonesson, Zlatev, forthcoming). 
Evidence for mereological experience outside of human beings is 
mostly indirect. The study of picture perception in doves and apes, 
and everything in between, may have failed to establish that the 
animals are able to perceive pictures as pictures, but it certainly shows 
that they attend to both similarities and differences between a human 
being and the corresponding picture, or a real banana and its 
depiction, respectively (see Sonesson, Zlatev, forthcoming). It also 
appears that pigeons are able to identify objects, not only when not all 
of their parts are included in the rendering, but also when the 
depiction is perspectivally deformed, at least as long as some “geons” 
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are included, that is to say, as long as there are some components of 
objects which can be recognized from different perspectives and which 
include the relation to other components of the same objects (see 
Peissig et al. 2000). Indeed, our study of Alex’s attempts to imitate 
actions from static pictures containing some limited phase of the 
action could be taken to suggest that apes are able to identify events 
from time slices (Call et al., forthcoming). 
In their study of the genesis of grammar, Heine and Kuteva (2007: 
150ff, 276ff) ponder to what extent “animal cognition” may com-
prehend “hierarchical taxonomic relations” such as inclusion (category 
membership), property relationship (our intensional hierarchies), and 
partonymy or meronymy (our extensional hierarchies), as well as social 
relationships, possession, and location. Although they take into account 
different evidence than we have mentioned here, they conclude that 
basic abilities for hierarchical thinking are present in such animals as 
have been studied, notably in apes, monkeys, and at least one grey 
parrot. They go on to propose that the underpinnings of recursion, 
which others claim to be specific to human language, are within the 
reach of “animal thinking” (Heine, Kuteva 2007: 278f, 296f). Whether 
they mean to imply that all that is lacking in animal thinking for (full) 
recursion to be possible is the access to certain grammatical construc-
tions such as noun phrases and subordinate clauses is not easy to deter-
mine. Whatever makes the differences between recursion and/or 
language, on one hand, and animal experience on the other, it certainly 
does not seem to be the basic principles for grasping perceptual 
meaning.11 
                                                 
11  Heine and Kuteva (2007: 304) suggest that the presence in petroglyphs of 
animals without heads demonstrate that parts-whole relationships corresponding 
to the linguistic head-dependant structure were “conceptually present” 10.000–
15.000 years ago. That seems an overdrawn conclusion. Since petroglyphs are 
picture signs, factoriality may very well have taken much longer to appear in 
pictures than in perception, but it does not follow that it appeared at the same 
time in language. 
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As for symbolicity, Peirce no doubt takes it to be synonymous with 
the sign relation (see Table 1). However, if symbolicity, in a parallel 
fashion to iconicity and indexicality, involves all conceivable con-
nections between phenomena that are based on rules or habits, then 
the sign function is only a particular case of such symbolicity. Not only 
will there thus exist symbolic grounds in the Lifeworld which are not 
signs, in the sense defined above (traffic rules, for instance, the rules of 
chess, and so on), but it is also possible to base a sign function on a 
pre-existing symbolic ground, just as happens with iconicity and 
indexicality: thus, for instance, it has been a habit (or even a norm) for 
a long time in our culture for women to wear skirts, and thus the skirt 
may become a sign of a woman, as it does, indirectly by means of 
depiction, on the common variety of signs for indicating the ladies’ 
restroom. 
 
 
2. Primary and secondary iconic signs 
 
In his definition of iconic signs, Peirce maintains that the property of 
iconicity is independent, not only of the sign relation (which is also 
true of indexical signs), but also of the relation between the two things 
involved. There are several ways in which the relevant notion of 
independence may be taken, some of which give quite absurd results: 
thus, there is a sense in which the portrait Leonardo made of Mona 
Lisa (or even Picasso’s portrait of Gertrude Stein) cannot be said to be 
independent of the person depicted. On another interpretation, I 
would argue that the iconicity of some iconic signs is independent of 
the sign relation, in the sense that it is the perception of the iconic 
relationship which cues us to the existence of the sign relation; but 
then, conversely, the iconicity of other iconic signs is dependant on 
the sign relation, because the sign relation is that which makes us 
discover their iconicity. I have called these big groups of signs primary 
and secondary iconic signs, respectively.  
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2.1. The intervention of iconicity in the sign 
 
The relative part played by iconicity and conventionality in a sign may 
be used to distinguish primary and secondary iconicity. In fact, to be 
more precise, we should distinguish primary and secondary iconic 
signs, since we are really involved with the way iconicity is assigned to 
signs. A primary iconic sign is a sign in the case of which the 
perception of a similarity between an expression E and a content C is at 
least a partial reason for E being taken to be the expression of a sign 
the content of which is C. That is, iconicity is really the motivation 
(the ground), or rather, one of the motivations, for positing the sign 
function. A secondary iconic sign, on the other hand, is a sign in the 
case of which our knowledge that E is the expression of a sign the 
content of which is C, in some particular system of interpretation, is at 
least a partial reason for perceiving the similarity of E and C. Here, 
then, it is the sign relation that partially motivates the relationship of 
iconicity. In a sense, what I here call secondary iconic signs are not 
very good examples of iconicity, as the latter is characterised by Peirce, 
for the definition clearly implies that, in at least one sense, the 
iconicity of the signs is not independent of their sign character: on the 
contrary, it is a precondition. Perhaps this does not have to be taken as 
an argument against Peirce’s definition: iconicity per se may well be 
independent of the sign function, even though its presence in signs 
may sometimes be conditioned by the sign function. More precisely, 
what is at stake here is the independence of the iconic ground from the 
sign function. 
Pictures are, of course, primary iconic signs in this sense, and they 
may well be the only kind there is. In fact, given the facts about picture 
perception in apes and small children referred to in the first part, there 
is a reason to believe that pictures are the only primary iconic signs for 
human beings which have reached at least the age of 2 or 3 years. 
Before that age, it could be argued, pictures are not primary iconic 
signs, because they are no signs at all, but are rather ranged with the 
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objects they depict in one and the same category. This shows that the 
primarity and secondarity of iconic signs is relative to a given 
(collective) subject.  
On the other hand, no matter our age, we do have to learn that, in 
certain situations, and according to particular conventions, objects 
which are normally used for what they are, become signs of themselves, 
of some of their properties, or of the class of which they form part: a 
car at a car exhibition, a stone axe in the museum showcase or a tin 
cane in a shop window, an emperor’s impersonator when the emperor 
is away, and a urinal (if it happens to be Duchamp’s ‘Fountain’) at an 
art exhibition. When used to stand for themselves, objects are clearly 
iconic: they are signs consisting of an expression that stands for a 
content because of properties which each of them possess intrinsically. 
And yet, without having access to a set of conventions and/or an array 
of stock situations, we have no possibility of knowing either that 
something is a sign or what it as sign of: of itself as an individual object, 
of a particular category (among several possible ones) of which it is a 
member, or of one or another of its properties. A car, which is not a 
sign on the street, becomes a sign at a car exhibition, as does Man 
Ray’s iron in a museum. We have to know the showcase convention to 
understand that the tin can in the shop-window stands for many other 
objects of the same category; we need to be familiar with the art 
exhibition convention to realise that each object merely signifies itself; 
and we are able to understand that the tailor’s swatch is a sign of its 
pattern and colour, but not of its shape, only if we have learnt the 
convention associated with the swatch (see Sonesson 1989: 137ff). 
When Man Ray makes a picture of a billiard table, we need no 
convention to recognise what it depicts. However, if Sherrie Levine’s 
(real, three-dimensional) billiard table is to represent Man Ray’s 
picture, there must be a label inverting the hierarchy of prominence of 
the Lifeworld. This shows that among the properties determining the 
probability of an object functioning as the expression of an iconic sign 
is to be found three-dimensionality rather than the opposite. Since the 
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inception of modernism, and particularly in the phase known as 
postmodernism, the sign function of pictures has been at the centre of 
interest: it is thus not surprising that artists, such as Levine, should 
employ themselves to inverse the normal Lifeworld hierarchy, which 
makes two-dimensional objects stand for three-dimensional ones, 
rather than the reverse. But similar things also happen in the world of 
everyday life: the Mexican woman who found Sweden to be full of 
“Barbies” made some inversion, because, building on her particular 
Lifeworld experience, she took real, animate, persons as being, at least 
for the duration of a speech act, representations of assembly-line 
fabricated objects, made of inanimate matter, that is, of dolls.  
However, identity signs, such as those mentioned above, in which 
there could be said to be too much iconicity for the sign to work on its 
own, do not constitute the only case in which the sign function has to 
precede and determine iconicity. In other cases, the sign function 
must precede the perception of iconicity because there is too little 
resemblance, as in the manual signs of the North American Indians, 
which, according to Garrick Mallery (1972[1881]: 94f), seem reason-
able when we are informed about their meaning. In Rudolf Arnheim’s 
terms (1969: 92f), a “droodle” is different from a picture in requiring a 
key, as Carraci’s mason behind a wall (Fig. 1b), or in “Olive dropping 
into martini glass or Close-up of girl in scanty bathing suit” (Fig. 1a). 
While both scenes are possible to discover in the drawing, both are 
clearly underdetermined by it. There are two ways in which we can try 
to avoid such an ambiguity. One is to fill in the details, in particular 
the details that are characteristically different in an olive and a navel, 
in the air and a pair of thighs, etc. At some point the droodle will then 
turn into a genuine picture. The other possibility, which is the only 
one considered by the critics of iconicity, is to introduce an explicit 
convention, such as Carraci’s key. 
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Figure 1.  Two droodles and a picture which can be read as a droodle: a) Olive 
dropping into Martini glass or Close-up of girl in scanty bathing suit (inspired by 
Arnheim as adapted in Sonesson 1992). b) Carraci’s key (Mason behind wall);  
c) face or jar (inspired by Hermerén 1983: 101). 
 
 
According to Göran Hermerén (1983: 101), it is only because of “the 
limitations of human imagination” that we see Fig. 1c. as a human face, 
for it can equally well be perceived as “a jar from above, with some 
pebbles and broken matches on the bottom, and a stick placed across 
the opening”. Thus, it should be ambiguous in Bierman’s sense. It all 
depends on what is here meant by the limits of human imagination: 
Gestalt principles, the face as a privileged perceptual object (see E. 
Gibson 1969: 347 ff), and so on, all conspire to make one of the readings 
determinate. While it is possible to find the elements Hermerén suggests 
should be there in the picture, it is impossible to see the interpretation as 
a whole without being disturbed by the other reading. Thus, it seems 
that when an expression has similarities to different contents or 
referents, one of these may be favoured because of properties of the 
expression itself, and is not overridden by convention. 
No doubt the face is a very special object to human beings, which 
takes priority even to new-borns. At the level of cultural-specific 
properties, which are at least more general than the human face, we may 
consider the story of the Me’, who had never seen paper, and thus were 
impeded to consider it in the humble part of forming the content plane 
of picture signs (see Sonesson 1989). But there seems also to be some 
more general facts as play with three-dimensionality, animateness, and 
movement being probably more prominent than their opposites, that is, 
From mimicry to mime by way of mimesis  43
more likely to form the content side of an iconic sign, without any 
supplementary convention being stated. The case of three-dimensio-
nality is instantiated in the comparison between the billiard-tables of 
Man Ray and Sherrie Levine. As for the “Barbies” of the Mexican 
woman, we must either suppose her to merely make a metaphor, or we 
have to take light skinned people to be so alien to her concept of people, 
that animateness, and even humanity, is overridden. This then is what I 
have termed the hierarchy of prominence of the Lifeworld.12 
In fact, in order understand primary iconic signs, we need to reach 
a better understanding of the hierarchy of prominence. Consider a 
counter-example to my prototype hierarchy offered by Bordon and 
Vaillant (2002: 59; Vaillant 1997): an ice statue of a motor cycle is less 
familiar to Parisians than a real motor cycle, and yet when the former 
is exhibited in front of the town hall, there is no doubt to anyone that 
the ice statue is the signifier, and the motor cycle the signified. The 
authors are guilty of several errors of interpretation, and yet their 
example is interesting. The prototype hierarchy is based on the notion 
of prominence characterised by the cognitive psychologists Eleanor 
Rosch (1975; Rosch, Mervis 1975) and Amos Tversky as cor-
responding to prototypicality, frequency, intensity, celebrity, infor-
mation, and so on. In this sense, if “familiarity” may, on some 
occasions, be the opposite of prominence, there are many other 
possibilities. But this also means that the concept of prominence is 
rather unclear: at least, it seems to be too open-ended. In any case, as I 
have conceived it above, the prototype hierarchy would not apply to 
                                                 
12  In a curious little essay, Davidsen and Munkholm Davidsen (2000: 82) take me 
to task, because, in their view, the concept of a hierarchy of prominence only 
apparently solves the problem of accounting for the natural asymmetry of the 
iconic sign: while it “might be taken to explain why an image of a man is the iconic 
representation of this man […], this does not contribute much more than to 
systematising relativism”. Systematic relativism is not that relative any more. In 
fact, it is the sense in which the Lifeworld, as Husserl points out, is subjective-
relative. 
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objects as such (except, perhaps, in some particular cases, as the face), 
but to some of their properties. Not the ice statue of a motor cycle, but 
perhaps ice as a material, might be argued to be “less prominent” 
(perhaps in the sense of more homogeneous, more ubiquitous in the 
history of mankind, etc.) than motorcycle parts. In the Me’ story, it is 
paper, not particular things made out of paper, which is ranked too 
high on the scale. 
But the example is also quite different from those I have discussed 
above, which either involved a two-dimensional object representing a 
three-dimensional one (as in the case of pictures), or a single three-
dimensional object being the sign of the class of which it is a part, of 
some of its properties, and so on. It is, however, similar to cases I have 
taken up elsewhere (notably Sonesson 1989: 336ff; in press): the 
tailor’s dummy and artificial food made out of plastic or wax, as seen 
in Japanese restaurants. The outcome of that discussion was that there 
were certain properties that were intrinsically more prominent in the 
human world, such as, apart from three-dimensionality, animateness 
and movement. The last of these features may of course be the factor 
that makes the real motorcycle more prominent than the one made 
out of ice. But a more general argument could in fact be made from 
the example of artificial food. There is a reason why the wax food is 
taken to represent the real food, rather than the opposite. Food is 
defined by the functional property (or the ‘affordance’ as Gibson 
would say; J. Gibson 1982) of being edible, and that is exactly the 
property which wax food lacks. The motorcycle, similarly, is defined 
by the property of being a vehicle, which is an expectation that the ice 
statue can hardly fulfil. If this shows that the ice motorcycle is no real 
counter-example, it also demonstrates the complexity of secondary 
iconicity. The prototype hierarchy should not be expected to form 
some rigid structure fixed once and for all.13 
                                                 
13  This also shows that the “Barbie” example given above is much more complex 
than what I hinted at: from the point of view of animateness, and the like, even the 
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Another, more important lesson of this discussion, however, is that 
primary and secondary iconicity should not be taken to be an all or 
none affair: just as a sign may contain iconic, indexical and symbolic 
properties at the same time, it may very well mix primary and se-
condary iconicity. 
 
 
2.2. Iconicity in language and pictures 
 
When talking about the arbitrariness of the (linguistic) sign, Saussure 
in fact was concerned (as noted most clearly by Bertil Malmberg 1977: 
131ff) with two different relationships: within the sign, between 
expression and content; and between the sign as a whole and the world 
of our experience, often called the referent. The first relationship is 
arbitrary, because there are no properties possessed in common by the 
content and the expression; the second relationship is arbitrary, 
because (according to Saussure) the way in which signs segment the 
world are not prefigured in the division of the world itself. Thus, there 
is no more justification for calling a “bull” /bul/ than for using the 
sound sequences /bøf/. And on the other hand, reality does not give us 
any clues whether a certain phenomenon should be characterised with 
one sign, such as “wood”, or divided between two different signs, such 
as “bois” and “forêt”. If arbitrariness can be found between different 
elements of the sign, its opposite, motivation, which is the term 
Saussure used for iconicity, must also be able to manifest itself in 
                                                                                                    
Mexican woman does not really consider the doll to be more prominent than the 
human beings who are blond (or so I would hope). It is when attending to hair, skin 
colour, and the like, that she ranks the Barbie doll higher on the scale than those 
alien human beings seen in Sweden. This is the stuff of which metaphors are made. 
(See Sonesson 1989, 2010). Interpreted in another way, it is the point of departure of 
the distinction which is basic to cultural semiotics. (See Sonesson 2000b). 
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multiple relationships (see Fig. 2 and Sonesson 1989: 203ff).14 More 
cautiously, we should perhaps talk about three potentially iconic 
relationships: between expression and content, between expression 
and referent, and between content and referent. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The linguistic sign. Arrows stand for (potential) iconic relationships. 
 
 
Moreover, the two cases mentioned pertain to different aspects of 
similarity or its opposite: in the first case, we are concerned with the 
different subdivisions of expression and content; in the second case, it is 
the outer borders of the sign and the corresponding phenomenon in the 
world which are involved. If the first is on the level of what was known 
                                                 
14  It would be natural to understand motivation to include both iconicity and 
indexicality, but this is not how the term is used by Saussure. In the Cours, 
Saussure is really only interested in “relative motivation”, which is a relationship 
between signs, not between expression and content, such as for instance 
“pommier” (“apple tree”) being justified by “pomme” (“apple”). In other passages, 
however, which I quoted in Sonesson 1989, he talks about mime being motivated 
but having “a rudiment of arbitrarity”. 
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in structuralist semiotics, following Hjelmslev, as “figurae”, the latter is 
firmly on the sign level. In addition, the former concerns the properties 
of expression and content, respectively, while the latter has to do with 
the way signs and the corresponding chunks of reality are divided up. 
In the picture, the case is even more complex. It has been argued by 
Husserl (1980), and, no doubt independently, by Richard Wollheim 
(1980), that we “see in” the depicted object directly into the physical 
object which is the picture expression, making more or less each 
element of the expression correspond to the content. But Husserl goes 
on to note that this is not the whole story, because although we can see 
human figures “into” the spots on the surface of the photograph, what 
we see still has “photographic colours”, and not the colour of real 
human skin. This may seem a dated observation, but in fact all 
pictures reduce the scope of colours rendered in relation to reality. In 
Husserl’s terminology, the picture thing is that which may hang askew 
on the wall, the picture object is the child in black and white which is 
seen into it, and the picture subject is the object of the world which is 
taken to be depicted, the real child with rosy cheeks. But here Husserl’s 
cautious phenomenology does not seem to go far enough. To separate 
the picture object and the picture subject Husserl also offers the 
distinction between the palace that is seen into the picture and the real 
palace which is in Berlin. However, the fact that there may no longer 
be any palace in Berlin does not deter us from noting the difference 
between a palace in black and white and a real palace. Thus, the 
referent must be separated from the picture subject, which remains at 
the level of types, since it is different from the picture object simply by 
adding our knowledge of the nature of things in the world. 
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Figure. 3. The picture sign. The arrows are (potential) iconic relationships. The 
text mentions some examples of what may be implied, but it is far from clear 
whether all those distinctions have experimental counterparts. 
 
 
Iconicity thus potentially involves six iconic relationships: between the 
picture thing and the picture object, between the picture object and 
the picture subject, between the picture thing and the picture subject; 
and between those three and the referent (Fig. 3). In actual fact, all 
these relationships may perhaps not be meaningfully distinguished. 
However, it is interesting that it is for the relation between the picture 
object and the picture subject that Husserl requires similarity (1980: 
138f. and passim), i.e. for two instances that are roughly equivalent to 
Peirce’s “immediate” and “dynamical object”. Except once, when he 
says that a relief is comparatively more similar to its picture object 
(Husserl 1980: 487ff), Husserl never discusses the similarity of the 
picture object and the picture thing. Nor does he consider the 
similarity of the picture thing and the picture subject, which is the 
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closest we come to Peirce’s relation between the “representamen” and 
the “object”. It is in the relation between the picture object and the 
picture subject that pictoriality may be more or less extensive, and 
more or less intensive, that is, concern a greater or lesser number of 
properties, and realise them to a greater or lesser degree (“Extensität” 
and “Intensität der Bildlichkeit”, Husserl 1980: 56f). However, there 
does not seem to be any reason not to apply extensivity and intensivity 
to all iconic relationships. In addition, extensivity can obtain in 
relation not only to the division of the object into properties (for 
example, “red”), but also into proper parts (for example, “cheeks”), 
and, at least in the case of pictures, perspectives (for example, seen 
from upper left). Such a definition derives from mereology, the study 
of the ways to divide up the things of the world. 
From the point of view of the relation between sign and referent, 
the kind of iconicity present in language would seem to be largely 
secondary. This has been argued independently by De Cuypere (2008: 
80) and Sonesson (2008). However, the truth may actually be that the 
kinds of interpretation characteristic of primary iconicity and 
secondary iconicity have to be applied in several rounds, in order to 
account for the process of interpretation as it occurs, as suggested by 
Ahlner and Zlatev (this volume) from the study of the kind of iconicity 
rather inappropriately known as “sound symbolism”. This again 
suggests that primary and secondary iconicity may not be the most 
appropriate terms for the phenomena we have delimited. 
 
 
3. Two extremes of iconicity:  
from mimicry to mime 
 
In the night of all iconicities, there is no difference between “the same 
stuff again”, mimicry, pictures, imitation, and pantomime. On the 
contrary, we will explore in the following the different ways in which 
iconicity pertains to mimicry and similar phenomena and to imitation 
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in several senses of the term, including (panto)mime. In the first case, 
the fundamental question will be for whom iconicity is supposed to 
obtain. The second case involves the more subtle case of acts being 
presented by somebody to somebody else.15 
 
 
3.1. On mimicry, scarecrows, and effigies 
 
It has been suggested by Carlo Ginzburg (2002) that the origin — 
whatever he means by that — of signs (or “representations”, as he puts 
it) it to be found in the effigies of kings and other heroes created after 
their death. The idea behind this reconstruction is easy to understand: 
someone of importance (to some particular person, or more 
commonly to some tribe or culture) has died, and to make up for his 
absence, a surrogate must be created. Or, at a more generic level, a 
human being is needed to scare the birds off the field (supposing 
“human being” to be a concept in the world of birds), and since a 
human being cannot always be around, a scarecrow is erected in his 
place. Or, to retain our scope on remarkable individuals, the Chinese 
emperor and, more recently, Saddam Hussein, were known to have 
their doubles. The idea can then be generalized to the sign being 
anything standing for something that is absent.  
But neither the scarecrow nor the doubles are “about” human 
beings. They are not typical signs, if we take the latter to be exempli-
fied by such things as language, pictures, and gestures. Signs, as we 
have seen, are standpoints taken on the world of our experience — 
that is, in Piaget’s terms they are conceived “from the subject’s point of 
view” (though normally the subject is a social one). Scarecrows, 
doubles and (perhaps) effigies do not present human beings in their 
absence, thereby taking a stand on what they are. Understood in this 
                                                 
15  It goes without saying that mimicry, mime, and other phenomena discussed 
here may also have indexical and symbolic traits, but these are not our business. 
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way, surrogates would seem to be of the same general kind as 
camouflage, but quite the opposite of signs. Elsewhere, I have taken 
Deacon (1997: 76ff) to task for claiming that camouflage in the animal 
world (such as the moth’s wings being seen by the bird as “just more 
tree”) are essentially of the same kind as those “typical cases” of 
iconicity we are accustomed to call pictures (Sonesson 2006). In fact, 
camouflage will only function as such, to the extent that it is not 
recognized for what it is, whereas, on the contrary, a picture, or any 
other sign, can only work as a sign, to the extent that it is seen to be a 
sign, and not, for instance, another instance of what it depicts or 
otherwise signifies (that is, a picture of a banana, and not only a bad 
instance of the category “bananas”). In this respect, scarecrows, just as 
Saddam Hussein’s doubles, are like camouflage, because they only 
accomplish their function, as long as they are not recognized for what 
they are, that is, for not really being human beings or Saddam Hussein, 
respectively. As recounted by Ginzburg, effigies seem to be rather 
similar to our scarecrows. They are still different from camouflage, 
familiar in the animal world (but not, of course, as a military pro-
cedure), in being known by their creator (though not their receiver) 
not to be the real thing.  
However, perhaps there is a more subtle sense in which effigies 
may be different from scarecrows from the beginning: by being known 
to be different from heroes, but still standing in their place, instead of 
being about them. Perhaps a better example of this would be the 
understudy, in the way that term is used in the theatre: the person who 
takes over the part normally played by a well-known actor in no sense 
“means” that actor. He simply is equivalent to the actor for the 
purpose of the performance here and now. Indeed, we should rather 
think about what the scarecrow is to the farmer: something taking the 
place of a human being for a particular purpose, but certainly not 
signifying “human being”. Perhaps we could say that this is the case 
where Searle’s (1995) formula, “X counts as Y in C” really applies. 
Effigies, understudies, and the scarecrow from the farmer’s point of 
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view do share some properties with signs: if they are understood as 
such, they stand for something which is different from themselves, so 
in order to grasp their function, you must get a sense both of their 
equivalence to what they stand for, and the difference between them 
and what they stand-in for. Thus, there is certainly a differentiation 
here, and some kind of asymmetrical relationship between the two 
items involved: but there is no possibility of one item being in any 
sense a stand taken by a subject (including a collective subject) on the 
other item. To see the difference, one may compare with exemplifi-
cations (things standing for themselves, for the category of which they 
are members, or for some property they have) and, in particular, what 
I have elsewhere called pseudo-identities, which are objects having all 
or most perceptual properties of the thing they stand for, but not those 
defining them: wax food, which cannot be eaten, the dummy showing 
the cloths in the shop window (see Sonesson 1989: 336ff and 2.1 
above).  
Camouflage, as the term is used by Deacon, is a particular case of 
(biological) mimicry, as Timo Maran (2007) has observed. According 
to Maran, mimicry in this sense is “a message (feature and signal) of 
one organism, the mimic, [which] resembles some message of another 
organism, which usually belongs to a different species, some feature of 
the environment, or a generalization of either of those, that is called 
the model”. As Maran judiciously points out, resemblance between 
two individuals of the same species is not mimicry. This is important, 
because we recognize the distinction we have observed earlier on 
between membership in a category and the sign function. Maran goes 
on to point out that the resemblance should have some functionality 
for the bearer. Thus, for instance, it may protect an animal from a 
well-known predator. Finally, accidental resemblances are not 
included, but only those which have a continuity in an evolutionary 
timescale. 
Except for the final characteristic, mimicry is similar to the case of 
the scarecrow: to work it must not be detected as such by the receiver. 
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However, the scarecrow is a human-made device, which means that, 
while for the receiver of the message it is simply a feature of the 
environment, for the sender it shares at least with the sign the 
characteristics of being differentiated and asymmetrical. In mimicry, 
on the other hand, neither sender nor receiver is in any way involved 
with anything that resembles a sign. The mimic and the model, and 
thus the iconicity, only exists for the outside observer.16 
 
 
3.2. Imitation as learning procedure and as sign 
 
Imitation is clearly central in some sense to the emergence of the sign. 
It also has obvious iconic traits. Imitation, or, more exactly, 
“representative imitation”, is claimed by Piaget (1967[1945]) to be at 
the origin of the semiotic function. When more closely scrutinized, 
however, some instances of imitation actually turn out to be signs, 
while others clearly are not. Indeed, some kinds of imitation would 
appear to be processes that are prerequisites to the emergence of the 
sign function. 
In his model of human evolution, Merlin Donald places imitation 
within the second stage of human development, mimesis. This 
conception has been extended to child development, and made 
considerately more precise, by Jordan Zlatev (2007; 2009). In Donald’s 
view, mimetic culture starts out with the emergence of “conscious, 
self-initiated, representational acts, which are intentional [that is, 
                                                 
16  In a perspicacious comment, Maran censors my assumption that animals are 
not aware of being camouflaged. In many animal groups (moths, grabs, frogs), he 
goes on to say, “there are preferences for the selection of the resting place to 
achieve maximum correspondence between one’s appearance and the 
surrounding visual environment”. However intriguing this observation is, the 
underlying mechanism is still unclear, and, more to the point in the present 
context, camouflage is certainly possible without such alignment on the 
environment. 
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voluntary] but not linguistic” (Donald 1991: 168). The examples given 
by Donald are things like gesture, dance, ritual, mime, play-acting, and 
(precise) imitation, but also tool use (or perhaps rather the social 
generalization of tool use) and skill.17 Somewhere in between mimesis 
and language the sign function arises, though Donald notes this only 
obliquely, mentioning the use of intentional systems of communi-
cation and the distinction of the referent.  
One may wonder why tool use and skill are thought to be part of 
mimetic culture and not just “routine locomotor acts” or “procedural 
memory” which Donald (1991: 168) elsewhere takes pains to separate 
from mimesis. No doubt Donald (1991: 171ff) would answer that they 
are different because they comply with his criteria for mimetic acts: 
they are “intentional” (that is, voluntary), “generative” (that is, 
analysable into components which may be recombined into new 
wholes), and “communicative” (or at least, as we shall see “public”). 
Moreover, they have reference (“in mimesis the referential act must be 
distinguished from its referent”, that is, in our terms, there must be 
differentiation), stand for an unlimited number of objects, and are 
auto-cued (produced without an external stimulus). Generativity is a 
property of many kinds of meaning, which are not signs. However, it 
is not clear in what sense tool use and many other kinds of skill are 
“communicative”, and therefore, in which way they have reference 
and stand for an unlimited number of objects. 
                                                 
17    Curiously, Donald (1991: 170) claims to  have derived his idea of mimesis from 
the literary theorist Erich Auerbach, who wrote a history of realist literature with 
this very title. It would have been more fitting to refer to the sense of the term 
mimesis in Antiquity, not perhaps as used by Plato to describe the relationship 
between perceptual reality and the world of ideas, but rather to one of the usages 
to which the term is put, mainly by Aristotle, as the representation of action by 
action, different from (verbal) narration or diegesis. For a quite different sense of 
“mimesis”, see Maran 2003. 
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After introducing “communicativity” as a criterion of mimesis, 
Donald (1991: 172) goes on to say that “although mimesis may not have 
originated as a means of communication, and might have originated in 
a different means of reproductive memory, such as tool-making, 
mimetic acts by their nature are usually public and inherently possess 
the potential to communicate”. This, though, is very different from 
imitation as a sign, which is what is realised by the actor, who presents 
his acts to a specific public; it is even different from the child’s symbolic 
play, which must be available to and shared with other children. What 
we have here is, first, the extraction of a token from a type, which 
supposes treating the other as a spectacle, that is, something to be gazed 
at (called the “spectacular function” in Sonesson 2000b); and second, the 
realisation of the tool act, which is not public-directed, but can be made 
available to the public (Table 2). The use of the tool does require the 
separation of the typical properties from the single act occurring in the 
here and now, that is, relevance. In order to learn the use of a tool, you 
must at least be able to isolate the properties that should be imitated 
from those which are of no avail. However, even though this act of 
imitation may be observed, it is not part of its purpose to be observed. 
The case of imitation as accomplished by the action on a stage is quite 
different. When the actor who has the part of Hamlet lifts up the skull of 
“Poor Yorick”, then his act does not only consist in imitating what a 
man having that name supposedly did in Renaissance Denmark, but 
also in presenting this act as something to be seen, as a spectacular act 
(see Sonesson 2000b).18 The symbolic play of children may perhaps be 
considered to be some kind of intermediary case, because its spectacular 
character is not its ultimate goal, but is only instrumental in making the 
play function as play; indeed, it is not intentionally offered as a spectacle 
for individuals not participating in the play. 
                                                 
18  Here, as elsewhere, I am considering the sign form the point of view of the 
receiver and/or interpreter. The experience of the actor is of course quite another 
issue (as pointed out by Ester Võsu). 
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As should be clear from the examples given above, tool use and 
other kinds of skill as such are not strictly speaking mimesis, because, 
according to Donald’s own criteria, they are not communicative, 
although they are “public”, which is why they lend themselves to 
imitation — which leads to generalization of tool use and skill in 
society. This is where they become different from routine acts and 
procedural memory. They are socially shared. They constitute a 
process of learning. But this is only possible if the act can be separated 
from the unique tool user and transferred to another user. That is, the 
act as token must be abstracted to a type in order to be realised in 
another token. What is shared is the type, in other words the scheme 
of interpretation, which defines the principle of relevance (in the sense 
of a rule that picks out the properties of one object being mapped onto 
another). In this sense (not in the sense of reference), a single mimetic 
act may correspond to various events.  
It is therefore by means of imitation that the “extension of cons-
cious control into the domain of action” (Donald 2001: 261) may be 
obtained. But the act of imitation, in this instance, is in itself not a sign. 
If I see somebody use a stone as a tool to crack open the shell of a nut, 
I may do the same thing, not to bring into mind the act of the other 
person I have observed, but to obtain the same effect. I attempt to 
realise the same act as he did, that is, to open the shell up, so that I can 
take out the nut and eat it. Instead of producing an expression that is 
non-thematic but directly given which refers to a content that is 
thematic but indirectly given, I am realising a new instance of the cate-
gory of acts consisting in cracking open a nutshell.19 Like Tomasello’s 
apes, I may of course try to obtain the same effect without attending to 
                                                 
19  As Maran observes, comparative psychology may describe actions like these as 
being the result of “stimulus enhancement”. In ordinary life, however, there is 
nobody around to make us focus on specific stimuli, so we must fix our attention 
ourselves, which is why relevance (that is, the distinction between type and token) 
is a prerequisite for imitation. In practice, it is not so easy to make the distinction, 
as numerous experiments have shown us. See Sonesson, Zlatev, forthcoming. 
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the adequate means, which would produce a failed act of imitation. Or, 
I may merely simulate the outer actions of cracking the shell open, 
without letting them have a sufficient impact on the physical environ-
ment, in which case I may either be engaged in symbolic play, play-
acting, or simply practicing the movements. While it may be true that 
imitation as sign comes for free with imitation in the sense of learning, 
as Donald suggests (personal communication), and that thus most 
probably the sign function as such comes as a bonus once mimesis is 
attained, imitation in these two senses are at least phenomenologically 
distinct.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I have tried to spell out some important properties of 
iconicity and iconic signs, which are not usually taken into account. 
First, I suggested that the sign is in need of a much more specific and 
explicit definition than that given either in the Saussurean or the 
Peircean tradition — if it is going to be of any use in a theoretically 
developed and empirically grounded semiotics. In agreement with 
Peirce’s late insight that all his terms were too narrow, I choose to 
open up semiosis, by take the Saussurean sign, never defined by 
Saussure, as being a good example of a sign, which means that pictures 
and (at least some) gestures are signs, too, but not many other 
phenomena often claimed as such, for example percepts and other 
meanings close to perception. We have to have recourse to 
phenomenological variation in the imagination in order to arrive at a 
specific concept of sign, but, in fact, while Husserl himself did 
provided us with the criteria of focus and directness, Piaget, being a 
phenomenologist sans le savoir, discovered an even more fundamental 
property, that of differentiation, presupposed by the former. Once the 
sign has been defined independently of properties like iconicity, 
indexicality, and (in a slightly different sense of independence) 
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symbolicity, and once iconic, indexical, and symbolic grounds are 
shown to be found in direct experience, as well as in combination with 
the sign function, Peircean insights may be mustered, without losing 
ourselves into the night of all iconicities, where mimicry and mime 
and everything in between cannot be told apart.  
In the second part of the paper, I discussed two ways in which 
iconicity may be present in a sign, either as its condition or as its con-
sequence, thus giving rise to primary and secondary iconic signs, 
respectively. In the case of the primary iconic sign, I said, we take the 
perception of the similarity of what is later doomed to be the expres-
sion and the content as a reason for postulating a sign relation, which 
is not otherwise motivated, or at least not sufficiently motivated 
without the perception of similarity. The secondary iconic sign, on the 
contrary, makes perceptible the similarity between expression and 
content, only once the sign is known to pertain, either because there is 
a similarity to too many different things for this particular similarity to 
be noted, or because, without the sign relation, the thing in question 
would not be taken as a sign, but as an object in its own right. In the 
domain in which it was first defined, visual iconicity, this distinction 
has proved very useful, distinguishing true pictures from droodles, 
identity signs, and similar meanings. There can be no doubt that this 
distinction has done a very useful heuristic job, but it is certainly not 
sufficient on its own, because, once we take a closer look, we realise 
that there are many intermediary cases between primary and secon-
dary iconic signs, and this cannot be accounted for, in the way the 
distinction is now defined. Moreover, linguistic iconicity, with the 
exception of that which is sound based, seems to be exclusively 
secondary, which means the distinction is not of much help in that 
domain. 
In the third part, mimicry, in the biological sense, along with some 
other phenomena such as effigies and scarecrows, were distinguished 
from true signs, because they have a different relation than signs to the 
recognition on the part of the interpreter of what they are. At the same 
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time, starting out from Donald’s concept of mimesis, imitation was 
separated into a variety which is a kind of learning, supposing the 
extraction of a type from a token, and thus being a precursor to the 
sign, and another variety which as such is a sign, which is the case in 
pantomime and theatre. This distinction will however need further 
elucidation. Iconicity is clearly a variegated phenomenon, and much 
further study will be required in order to understand its manifold 
manifestations. We should certainly not declare the theory of iconicity 
finish any day soon. But we do need, I believe, a unified scheme of 
interpretation, although perhaps not a hierarchical one, if we are going 
to make any sense of the differences.20 
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От мимикрии через мимезис к миму:  
рефлексии над всеобщей теорией иконичности 
 
Почти все теории иконичности относятся критически к своему 
предмету (напр., Гудмен, Бирман, ранний Эко). Я развил собствен-
ную теорию иконичности, чтобы спасти определенный тип иконич-
ности, точнее — пикториальность, от подобной критики. Исходя из 
этого я считал нужным различать, с одной стороны, чистую иконич-
ность, основу иконичности и иконический знак, а с другой — 
первичные и вторичные иконические знаки. Но сейчас обстановка 
изменилась. Концептульные средства, созданные мною для объясне-
ния пикториальности, в их применении другими исследователями 
оказались подходящими для анализа иконичности языка. В то же 
время некоторые семиотики определяют распространенную в при-
роде мимикрию как тип иконичности. В эволюционной семиотике 
Дикона иконичность трактуется настолько широко, что она теряет 
свое значение, в то время как в понимании Дональда понятие миме-
зиса используется для обозначения только одной специфической 
фазы в эволюции иконического значения. Цель настоящей статьи — 
рассмотреть, в какой мере необходимо создание новых моделей 
иконичности при распространении теории иконичности на новые 
сферы знания. 
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Peaaegu kõik ikoonilisuse teooriad on selle ainestiku kriitilised käsitlused 
(nt Goodman, Bierman ja varane Eco). Arendasin oma ikoonilisuse 
teooria selleks, et päästa teatud tüüpi ikoonilisust, täpsemalt pildilisust, 
säärasest kriitikast. Sellest lähtuvalt pidasin vajalikuks eristada ühelt poolt 
puhast ikoonilisust, ikoonilisuse alust ja ikoonilist märki ning teisalt 
esmaseid ja teiseseid ikoonilisi märke. Samas, vahepeal on olukord muu-
tunud. Kontseptuaalsed vahendid, mille ma lõin pildilisuse seletamiseks 
on teiste poolt rakendatuna osutunud kohasteks keelelise ikoonilisuse 
analüüsil. Teisalt, semiootikud, kelle lähtealused on minu omadest erine-
nud, on määratlenud eluslooduses laialdaselt esinevat mimikrit kui ikoo-
nilisuse tüüpi. Ikoonilisust Deaconi evolutsioonilises semiootikas mõiste-
takse niivõrd avaralt, et see on kaotamas oma sisu, samas kui Donaldi 
tõlgenduses tähistab mõiste mimesis vaid ühte spetsiifilist faasi ikoonilise 
tähenduse evolutsioonis. Antud artikli eesmärgiks on uurida, mil määral 
on vajalik uute ikoonilisuse mudelite loomine ikoonilisuse teooria 
laiendamisel uutesse valdkondadesse. 
 
 
Mimikrist mimeesi kaudu miimini:  
ikoonilisuse üldteooria refleksioone 
